Estoppel

33. Secondly, the Division Bench dealt with whether the parties can claim estoppel in the given circumstances. Herein, it was observed in the impugned judgment [GMR Kamalanga Energy Ltd. v. SEPCO Electric Power Construction Corpn., 2023 SCC OnLine Ori 5882] that the legal maxim allegans contraria non est audiendus [ A person who alleges contradictory facts is not to be heard.), being the foundation of the doctrine of estoppel, forbids raising of contradicting claims by the parties, especially when such a reliance results in detriment. Taking support from the decision of this Court in Pratima Chowdhury v. Kalpana Mukherjee [Pratima Chowdhury v. Kalpana Mukherjee, (2014) 4 SCC 196 : (2014) 2 SCC (Civ) 504], it clarified that estoppel by conduct necessitates an existing and unambiguous fact as legislated through Section 115 of the erstwhile Evidence Act, 1872, and also fairness, and exclusion of truth. Moreover, the decisions of this Court in Provash Chandra Dalui v. Biswanath Banerjee [Provash Chandra Dalui v. Biswanath Banerjee, 1989 Supp (1) SCC 487) and B.L Sreedhar v. K.M. Munireddy [B.L. Sreedhar v. K.M. Munireddy, (2003) 2 SCC 355) had explicitly distinguished estoppel from waiver, with the latter being an intentional relinquishment of one's right.

 

Arbitration-setting aside arbitral award

It was observed that despite no evidence of payments to subcontractors and the acclaimed settlement agreements being hearsay, more than INR 200 crores were awarded. This was, the Division Bench of the High Court observed [GMR Kamalanga Energy Ltd. v. SEPCO Electric Power Construction Corpn., 2023 SCC OnLine Ori 5882), clearly a jurisdictional error on part of the Arbitral Tribunal in contravention to the principles laid down in the decisions of this Court in ONGC v. Saw Pipes Ltd. (ONGC v. Saw Pipes Ltd., (2003) 5 SCC 705), and Associated Engg. Co. v. State of A.P. [Associated Engg. Co. v. State of A.P., (1991) 4 SCC 93] and decision to this effect by the High Court of Delhi in Mecamidi S.A. v. Flovel MG Holdings (P) Ltd. (Mecamidi S.A. v. Flovel MG Holdings (P) Ltd., 2019 SCC OnLine Del 9414]

46. Referencing another 3-Judge Bench decision of this Court in ONGC v. Western Geco International Ltd. [ONGC v. Western Geco International Ltd., (2014) 9 SCC 263: (2014) 5 SCC (Civ) 12), which was pronounced before the 246th Law Commission Report could be given effect to, it was asserted that an award would be adjudicated to be contrary to the "fundamental policy of Indian law" if there's a violation of doctrine of audi alteram partem [Hear the other side.], judicial approach has not been followed by the arbitrator, or the award falls outside the scope of doctrine of Wednesbury [Associated Provincial Picture Houses v. Wednesbury Corpn., (1948) 1 KB 223 (CA)] reasonableness in terms of its perversity.

47. Equivalent reliance has been placed on decisions of this Court in Associate Builders [Associate Builders v. DDA, (2015) 3 SCC 49: (2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 204), HRD Corpn. v. GAIL (India) Ltd. (HRD Corpn. v. GAIL (India) Ltd., (2018) 12 SCC 471: (2018) 5 SCC (Civ) 401], Ssangyong Engg. [Ssangyong Engg. & Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI, (2019) 15 SCC 131: (2020) 2 SCC (Civ) 213), and Gemini Bay Transcription (P) Ltd. v. Integrated Sales Service Ltd. [Gemini Bay Transcription (P) Ltd. v. Integrated Sales Service Ltd., (2022) 1 SCC 753: (2022) 1 SCC (Civ) 522) (B.R. Gavai, J., as he then was, was also a member of the Bench) to argue that the instant arbitral award ought not to have been interfered with by the Division Bench of the High Court.

48. Bringing the decision of this Court in a recent 3-Judge Bench decision in DMRC Ltd. v. Delhi Airport Metro Express (P) Ltd. [DMRC Ltd. v. Delhi Airport Metro Express (P) Ltd., (2024) 6 SCC 357: (2024) 3 SCC (Civ) 112) to our attention, wherein one of us (B.R. Gavai, J. as he then was) was also a member, it was asserted that interference with an arbitral award cannot frustrate the "commercial wisdom behind opting for alternate dispute resolution", merely because an alternative view exists.

60. Numerous decisions of this Court have crystallized the scope of limited interference Unquestionably, it is always a conscious decision by the parties entering the expeditious mode o dispute resolution in form of arbitration to oust or to minimize the involvement of courts as also observed by this Court in McDermott International Inc. v. Burn Standard Co. Ltd. (McDermott International Inc. v. Burn Standard Co. Ltd., (2006) 11 5CC 181] Further, it was in decision of this Court in Associate Builders (Associate Builders v. DDA, (2015) 3 SCC 49: (2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 204), wherein the coordinate Bench, while dealing with ground of an award being in conflict with "public policy under Section 34 of the 1996 Act, opined that during the said recourse merits of an award are not to be examined or re-visited, and such an inquiry is only permitted to certain specified circumstances. Therein, apropos the perversity of an award, mandating an interference, support was sought from decisions of this Court in State of Haryana v. Gopi Nath & Sons (State of Haryana v. Gopi Noth & Sons, 1992 Supp (2) SCC 312: (1990) 77 STC 1] and Kuldeep Singh v. Commr. of Police [Kuldeep Singh v. Commr. of Police, (1999) 2 SCC 10: 1990 SCC (L&S) 429) to recapitulate the working test of perversity.

68. Furthermore, in the process of discussing the jurisdiction and powers of courts under Sections 34 and 37 of the 1996 Act, a 3-Judge Bench of this Court, in UHL Power Co. (UHL Power Co. Ltd. v. State of H.P., (2022) 4 SCC 116: (2022) 2 SCC (Civ) 401] while holding that the learned Single Judge of the High Court concerned had exceeded his jurisdiction through interference with the arbitral award, explicated the reasons of such narrow scope of powers of a court under Section 34 of the 1996 Act. Referencing extensively on other decisions of this Court, namely, MMTC [MMTC Ltd. v. Vedanta Ltd., (2019) 4 SCC 163: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 293), K. Sugumar v. Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. (K. Sugumar v. Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd., (2020) 12 SCC 539), Dyna Technologies (Dyna Technologies (P) Ltd. v. Crompton Greaves Ltd., (2019) 20 SCC 1], and Porsa Kente Collieries [Parsa Kente Collieries Ltd. v. Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Utpadan Nigam Ltd., (2019) 7 SCC 236: (2019) 3 SCC (Civ) 552), it laid down that the courts do not sit in appeal over arbitral awards, therefore, the jurisdiction of the courts concerned is confined to specific grounds as laid down under Section 34 of the 1996 Act, for instance, violation of public policy, patent illegality, or misconduct. Furthermore, it is based on the principle of party autonomy and the need to uphold the finality of an arbitral award. Concluding, it iterated that when the parties have, through conscious decision-making, opted for arbitration as an alternative means of dispute mechanism, the courts ought to refrain from reappreciation of evidence or substitution of interpretation(s), unless the award is perverse, unreasonable, or contrary to the mandate of the statute or decisions of court.

95. To substantiate that the contract is paramount to the working, scope, and interpretation for the purpose of an award by the arbitrator, a reference may be made to another 3-Judge Bench decision in South East Asia Marine Engg. and Constructions Ltd. v. Oil India Ltd. [South East Asia Marine Engg. and Constructions Ltd. v. Oil India Ltd., (2020) 5 SCC 164: (2020) 3 SCC (Civ) 1] Therein, while rejecting the challenge to setting aside of the arbitral award, this Court made the following observations: (SCC pp. 176-77, paras 28-31)

"28. In this context, the interpretation of Clause 23 of the contract by the Arbitral Tribunal, to provide a wide interpretation cannot be accepted, as the thumb rule of interpretation is that the document forming a written contract should be read as a whole and so far as possible as mutually explanatory. In the case at hand, this basic rule was ignored by the Tribunal while interpreting the clause.

29. The contract was entered into between the parties in furtherance of a tender issued by the respondent herein. After considering the tender bids, the appellant issued a letter of intent. In furtherance of the letter of intent, the contract (Contract No. CCO/FC/0040/95) was for drilling oil wells and auxiliary operations. It is important to note that the contract price was payable to the "contractor" for full and proper performance of its contractual obligations. Further, Clauses 14.7 and 14.11 of the contract state that the rates, terms and conditions were to be in force until the completion or abandonment of the last well being drilled.

30. From the aforesaid discussion, it can be said that the contract was based on a fixed rate. The party, before entering the tender process, entered the contract after mitigating the risk of such an increase. If the purpose of the tender was to limit the risks of price variations, then the interpretation placed by the Arbitral Tribunal cannot be said to be possible one, as it would completely defeat the explicit wordings and purpose of the contract. There is no gainsaying that there will be price fluctuations which a prudent contractor would have taken into margin, while bidding in the tender. Such price fluctuations cannot be brought under Clause 23 unless specific language points to the inclusion.

31. The interpretation of the Arbitral Tribunal to expand the meaning of Clause 23 to include change in rate of HSD is not a possible interpretation of this contract, as the appellant did not introduce any evidence which proves the same."

97. In order to achieve an enhanced understanding apropos the scope of the powers and jurisdiction of an arbitrator, a reference may also be made to a decision of this Court in Associated Engg. [Associated Engg. Co. v. State of A.P., (1991) 4 SCC 93], which was determined vis-à-vis Section 30 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 wherein, it was observed that: (SCC pp. 103-105, paras 24-27)

"24. The arbitrator cannot act arbitrarily, irrationally, capriciously or independently of the contract. His sole function is to arbitrate in terms of the contract. He has no power apart from what the parties have given him under the contract. If he has travelled outside the bounds of the contract, he has acted without jurisdiction. But if he has remained inside the parameters of the contract and has construed the provisions of the contract, his award cannot be interfered with unless he has given reasons for the award disclosing an error apparent on the face of it.

25. An arbitrator who acts in manifest disregard of the contract acts without jurisdiction. His authority is derived from the contract and is governed by the Arbitration Act which embodies principles derived from a specialised branch of the law of agency (see Mustill and Bayd's Commercial Arbitration, 2nd Edn., p. 641). He commits misconduct if by his award he decides matters excluded by the agreement (see Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. II, 4th Edn., Para 622). A deliberate departure from contract amounts to not only manifest disregard of his authority or a misconduct on his part, but it may tantamount to a mala fide action. A conscious disregard of the law or the provisions of the contract from which he has derived his authority vitiates the award.

26. A dispute as to the jurisdiction of the arbitrator is not a dispute within the award, but one which has to be decided outside the award. An umpire or arbitrator cannot widen his jurisdiction by deciding a question not referred to him by the parties or by deciding a question otherwise than in accordance with the contract. He cannot say that he does not care what the contract says. He is bound by it. It must bear his decision. He cannot travel outside its bounds. If he exceeded his jurisdiction by so doing, his award would be liable to be set aside. As stated by Lord Parmoor: [Attorney-General for Manitoba v. Kelly, (1922) 1 AC 268] (AC p. 276)

It would be impossible to allow an umpire to arrogate to himself jurisdiction over a question which, on the true construction of the submission, was not referred to him. An umpire cannot widen the area of his jurisdiction by holding, contrary to the fact, that the matter which he affects to decide is within the submission of the parties.'

Evidence of matters not appearing on the face of the award would be admissible to decide whether the arbitrator travelled outside the bounds of the contract and thus exceeded his jurisdiction. In order to see what the jurisdiction of the arbitrator is, it is open to the court to see what dispute was submitted to him. If that is not clear from the award, it is open to the court to have recourse to

outside sources. The court can look at the affidavits and pleadings of parties; the court can look at the agreement itself. Bunge & Co. v. Dewar & Webb [Bunge & Co. v. Dewar & Webb, (1921) 8 U L Rep 436]

27. If the arbitrator commits an error in the construction of the contract, that is an error within his jurisdiction. But if he wanders outside the contract and deals with matters not allotted to him, he commits a jurisdictional error. Such error going to his jurisdiction can be established by looking into material outside the award. Extrinsic evidence is admissible in such cases because the dispute is not something which arises under or in relation to the contract or dependent on the construction of the contract or to be determined within the award. The dispute as to jurisdiction is a matter which is outside the award or outside whatever may be said about it in the award. The ambiguity of the award can, in such cases, be resolved by admitting extrinsic evidence. The rationale of this rule is that the nature of the dispute is something which has to be determined outside and independent of what appears in the award. Such jurisdictional error needs to be proved by evidence extrinsic to the award. [See Alopi Parshad & Sons Ltd. v. Union of India [Alopi Parshad & Sons Ltd. v. Union of India, 1960 SCC Online SC 13: (1960) 2 SCR 793: AIR 1960 SC 588]; Bunge & Co. v. Dewar & Webb [Bunge & Co. v. Dewar & Webb, (1921) 8 LI L Rep 436); Christopher Brown Ltd. v. Genossenschaft Oesterreichischer [Christopher Brown Ltd. v. Genossenschaft Oesterreichischer, (1954) 1 QB 8: (1953) 3 WLR 689); R. v. Fulham (R. v. Fulham, (1951) 2 KB 1]; Falkingham v. Victorian Railways Commission [Falkingham v. Victorian Railways Commission, 1900 AC 452: 69 LJ PC 89]; R. v. All Saints, Southampton [R. v. All Saints, Southampton, (1828) 7 B&C 785:1 Man & Rey KB 663]; Laing (James) Son & Co. (M/C) Ltd. v. Eastcheap Dried Fruit Co. [Laing (James) Son & Co. (M/C) Ltd. v. Eastcheap Dried Fruit Co., (1961) 1 U L Rep 142), LI L Rep at p. 145; Dalmia Dairy Industries Ltd. v. National Bank of Pakistan (Dalmia Dairy Industries Ltd. v. National Bank of Pakistan, (1978) 2 LI L Rep 223); Heyman v. Darwins Ltd. (Heyman v. Darwins Ltd., 1942 AC 356 (HL)); Union of India v. Kishorilal Gupta & Bros. [Union of India v. Kishorilal Gupta & Bros., 1959 SCC OnLine SC 6: AIR 1959 SC 1362 : (1960) 1 SCR 493); Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co. (Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co., (1984) 4 SCC 679: (1985) 1 SCR 432); Jivarajbhai Ujamshi Sheth v. Chintamanrao Balaji [Jivarajbhai Ujamshi Sheth v. Chintamanrao Balaji, 1963 SCC OnLine SC 285: (1964) 5 SCR 480 : AIR 1965 SC 214]; Gobardhan Das v. Lachhmi Ram [Gobardhan Das v. Lachhmi Ram, (1954) 1 SCC 566: AIR 1954 SC 689], AIR at p. 692; Thawardas Pherumal v. Union of India [Thawardas Pherumal v. Union of India, (1955) 1 SCC 372: (1955) 2 SCR 48: AIR 1955 SC 468]; Omanhene Kobina Foli v. Obeng Akessee [Omanhene Kobina Foli v. Obeng Akessee, 1934 SCC OnLine PC 11: AIR 1934 PC 185 : (1934) 40 LW 138], AIR PC at p. 188; F.R. Absalom Ltd. v. Great Western (London) Garden Village Society Ltd. [F.R. Absalom Ltd. v. Great Western (London) Garden Village Society Ltd., 1933 AC 592 (HL)] and M. Golodetz v. Schrier [M. Golodetz v. Schrier, (1947) 80 LI L Rep 647].]"

125. We summarize the aforesaid findings as, despite the limited scope of interference, the Division Bench was obligated to have interfered with the arbitral award owing to fulfilment of conditions mandating a reappreciation of the merits of the award under Section 34 of the 1996 Act. Non-interference and non-setting aside of the award would have hampered upon the fundamental policy of Indian law as well as the public policy of India. The Arbitral Tribunal, itself being a creature of the EPC agreements, could not have travelled beyond its mandate to rewrite the constitution of its own existence through observing the condition of notice having been waived. It further discriminated between the parties, showcasing violation of the provisions of the 1996 Act. As this arbitral award could not have been severed owing to the aforesaid reasons, thereby it is apt to set aside the whole arbitral award.

Scope of Sec 37 of Arbitration and conciliation Act

50. Thirdly, asserting on the scope of interference under Section 37 of the 1996 Act, it is contended that the scope under this section is narrower than that of Section 34 of the 1996 Act and the court while exercising its power under Section 37 of the 1996 Act, must only ascertain that the court under Section 34 of the 1996 Act did not exceed its jurisdiction, citing decisions of this Court in Mмтс [MMTC Ltd. v. Vedanta Ltd., (2019) 4 SCC 163: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 293), Reliance Infrastructure Ltd. v. State of Goa [Reliance Infrastructure Ltd. v. State of Goa, (2024) 1 SCC 479: (2024) 1 SCC (Civ) 412] , and a 3-Judge Bench decision in UHL Power Co. Ltd. v. State of H.P. [UHL Power Co. Ltd. v. State of H.P., (2022) 4 SCC 116: (2022) 2 SCC (Civ) 401)

71. A perusal of the aforesaid elaborates that an appeal lies against an order of either setting aside of an arbitral award or refusal thereof under Section 34 of the 1996 Act under Section 37 sub-section (1) clause (c) of the 1996 Act. The provision, as also interpreted by decisions of courts in India, demonstrates that the scope under Section 37 is inherently limited or rather, narrower, and is governed by the mandate or parameters or grounds under Section 34 sub-section (2) of the 1996 Act.

72. The decision in MMTC [MMTC Ltd. v. Vedanta Ltd., (2019) 4 SCC 163: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 293), as referenced recently by a coordinate Bench of this Court in Reliance Infrastructure Ltd. [Reliance Infrastructure Ltd. v. State of Goa, (2024) 1 SCC 479: (2024) 1 SCC (Civ) 412), unfolds in an involute manner that a court under Section 37 of the 1996 Act can only determine as to whether the court concerned under Section 34 has not travelled beyond the parameters of the scope therein. No independent evaluation is permitted on the merits of the award.

Power of modify award

62. In M. Hakeem (NHAI v. M. Hakeem, (2021) 9 SCC 1: (2021) 4 SCC (Civ) 437], this Court observed that when courts exercise their powers under Section 34 of the 1996 Act, they have a limited ability to set aside an award, as and when any of the grounds laid down by the statute under Section 34 are triggered or fulfilled. It also clarified that such a power does not include the power of the courts to modify an arbitral award. The Division Bench therein observed as follows: (SCC pp. 14-15 & 30, paras 16 & 48)

"16. What is important to note is that, far from Section 34 being in the nature of an appellate provision, it provides only for setting aside awards on very limited grounds, such grounds being contained in sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 34. Secondly, as the marginal note of Section 34 indicates, "recourse" to a court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application for setting aside such award in accordance with sub-sections (2) and (3). "Recourse" is defined by P. Ramanatha Aiyar's Advanced Law Lexicon (3rd Edn.) as the enforcement or method of enforcing a right. Where the right is itself truncated, enforcement of such truncated right can also be only limited in nature. What is clear from a reading of the said provisions is that, given the limited grounds of challenge under sub-sections (2) and (3), an application can only be made to set aside an award. This becomes even clearer when we see sub-section (4) under which, on receipt of an application under sub-section (1) of Section 34, the court may adjourn the Section 34 proceedings and give the Arbitra Tribunal an opportunity to resume the arbitral proceedings or take such action as will eliminate the grounds for setting aside the arbitral award. Here again, it is important to note that it is the opinion of the Arbitral Tribunal which counts in order to eliminate the grounds for setting aside the award, which may be indicated by the court hearing the Section 34 application.

48. Quite obviously if one were to include the power to modify an award in Section 34, one would be crossing the Lakshman Rekha and doing what, according to the justice of a case, ought to be done. In interpreting a statutory provision, a Judge must put himself in the shoes of Parliament and then ask whether Parliament intended this result. Parliament very clearly intended that no power of modification of an award exists in Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1996. It is only for Parliament to amend the aforesaid provision in the light of the experience of the courts in the working of the Arbitration Act, 1996, and bring it in line with other legislations the world over."

63. It is pertinent to note that this decision in M. Hakeem [NHAI v. M. Hakeem, (2021) 9 SCC 1: (2021) 4 SCC (Civ) 437] to the effect that courts do not have any power to modify an arbitral award, was opined to be correct in law, albeit by a minority opinion in a recent 5-Judge Bench decision of this Court in Gayatri Balasamy v. ISG Novasoft Technologies Ltd. (Gayatri Balasamy v. ISG Novasoft Technologies Ltd., (2025) 7 SCC 1) with the exception that the courts indeed have the power to carry out corrections in computational, clerical or typographical errors, and any other errors of similar nature, owing to the principle of actus curiae neminem gravabit [ An act of the Court shall prejudice no man.]. However, the majority opinion, authored by Sanjiv Khanna, C.J. (as he then was) on his behalf and three others (including both of us), therein observed that the authority to modify an arbitral award is restricted and should only be used in case of well-defined, precise conditions while establishing standards for the use of a court modifying such an award and clarifying import facets thereof.

64. Firstly, the Court in Gayatri Balasamy [Gayatri Balasamy v. ISG Novasoft Technologies Ltd., (2025) 7 SCC 1] upheld the power of a court as granted by Section 34 sub-section (2) clause (a) sub-clause (iv) of the 1996 Act to sever the "invalid" sections of an award from the "valid" ones. The concept of kompetenz-kompetenz [ Power to decide on its own jurisdiction.] is consistent with the aforesaid idea as iterated and discussed in Part II of the decision. While discussing the concept of power of a court to sever an award, it clarified that it is not always available, particularly in situations wherein the legitimate and the invalid portions of an award are inextricably intertwined, rendering partial annulment infeasible in such situations.

65. Secondly, holding that a court has power to correct clerical, computational, or typographical errors that appear manifest on the face of the record in Parts IV and V of the decision, the Court in Gayatri Balasamy [Gayatri Balasamy v. ISG Novasoft Technologies Ltd., (2025) 7 SCC 1] elucidated that such authority of a court ought not to be mistaken for a review of the award on merits. Such modifications are permissible within the strict parameters of judicial oversight under Section 34 o the 1996 Act, wherein the court only corrects inadvertent errors as opposed to conducting substantial re-evaluation of the decision of an arbitrator, thereby reiterating the decisions of thi Court in the likes of Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal [Grindlays Bank Ltd. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal, 1980 Supp SCC 420: 1981 SCC (L&S) 309] which upheld procedura corrections undertaken by a court to an arbitral award.

Place of Arbitration

79. Undoubtedly, in the absence of the express or implied choice of law, it is the law that has the closest as well as the most real connection with the arbitration agreement, that is applicable. This position was recently iterated by a 3-Judge Bench of this Court while dealing with an application under Section 11 sub-section (6) of the 1996 Act, in Disortho S.A.S. v. Meril Life Sciences (P) Ltd. [Disortho S.A.S. v. Meril Life Sciences (P) Ltd., (2026) 2 SCC 599]

81. Clarifying on the distinction between the seat of arbitration and venue of arbitration proceedings, observations of this Court in Enercon (India) Ltd. v. Enercon Gmbh [Enercon (India) Ltd. v. Enercon Gmbh, (2014) 5 SCC 1: (2014) 3 SCC (Civ) 59) reiterates that when a seat of arbitration is India, it would only be the courts of India that would have exclusive jurisdiction to determine any disputes pertaining to the process of arbitration thereof.

Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1940

98. Examining the principles involved, a reference to decisions under the Arbitration Act, 1940, may also be apprised through the decision of a 3-Judge Bench of this Court in Allen Berry and Co. (P) Ltd. v. Union of India (Allen Berry and Co. (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (1971) 1 SCC 295] wherein this Court considered the proper scope of judicial review of arbitral awards and iterated that a court has the right to review documents that are specifically included in an award while reviewing it. However, as also observed in some cases, the courts, especially in the United Kingdom, have travelled farther and set aside the awards in which the contracts have merely been referred in passing, and apparently were incorrectly incorporated, forming the foundation of a verboten award.

Conclusion : Landmark judgment of Supreme Court analyzing various other judgments u/s 34 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act.